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THE FREEDOM OF NON-SPEECH
FREE SPEECH BEYOND WORDS. Mark V. Tushnet,1
Alan K. Chen,2 and Joseph Blocher.3 NYU Press. 2017. Pp.
vii + 260. $28.00 (Cloth).
Enrique Armijo4
INTRODUCTION
How does one achieve eternal bliss? By saying dada. How does
one become famous? By saying dada . . . . How can one get rid
of everything that smacks of journalism, worms, everything nice
and right, blinkered, moralistic, europeanised, enervated? By
saying dada . . . .
I don’t want words that other people have invented. All the
words are other people’s inventions. I want my own stuff, my
own rhythm, and vowels and consonants too, matching the
rhythm and all my own.5

On the evening of August 29, 1952, at Maverick Concert
Hall, an open-air theater deep in the Catskill Mountains’ forest
preserve on the outskirts of Woodstock, New York, the virtuoso
pianist David Tudor strode out onstage before an unsure
audience, sat at a piano, set a stopwatch, closed the keyboard lid,
and for 30 seconds, did nothing. He then opened the lid, reclosed
it, reset the watch, and sat silently again for an additional 2
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
2. William M. Beaney Memorial Research Chair Professor, University of Denver
Sturm College of Law.
3. Professor of Law, Duke Law School.
4. Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Associate Professor, Elon University
School of Law; Affiliate Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project. Thanks to
Vincent Blasi, Joseph Blocher, Alan Chen, Heidi Kitrosser, Kate Klonick, Helen Norton,
David Pozen, Scott Skinner-Thompson, Alexander Tsesis, Mark Tushnet, Morgan
Weiland, and to colleagues at the 2017 Loyola University Chicago Constitutional Law
Colloquium and Yale Law School Information Society Project Freedom of Expression
Scholars Conference for comments and suggestions. Thanks as well to Britney Boles and
Helen Tsiolkas for research assistance.
5. Hugo Ball, Dada Manifesto (1916), https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Dada_
Manifesto_ (1916,_Hugo_Ball) (last updated June 11, 2017).
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minutes and 23 seconds. He opened and closed the lid, again sat
silently at the piano keys for another timed minute and 40
seconds, stood up, and walked offstage.6
Though Tudor was careful to make no audible sounds during
the performance, the sheet music at his piano was not blank. The
composer’s notation read “Tacet.7 For any instrument or
instruments.” The score noted three movements and their lengths,
demarcated in the performance by Tudor’s opening and closing of
the piano’s keyboard lid, and, in a subsequent recreation of the
score, a series of vertical lines intended to indicate the passage of
time.8
Composer John Cage, the author of that score, would say that
the piece, then tentatively called Four Movements, later named
4’33” after its total length, was inspired by artist Robert
Rauschenberg’s White Paintings, which Cage had encountered at
a Rauschenberg solo show the year before Tudor’s performance.9
The White Paintings were five paneled works “painted on canvas
in a smooth, unmodulated white.”10 Cage interpreted the images
not as a means to project the artist’s own expression, but rather as
“backdrops against which the flux of the world might stand out.”11
Cage would describe the White Paintings as “mirrors of the air,”
and “airports for the lights, shadows, and particles” of the rooms
in which the paintings were displayed.12 Their lack of form focused
the viewer’s attention on naturally occurring images, such as the
changes in light and shadow in the surrounding space. The
message Rauschenberg sought to communicate could only be
expressed by stripping away the paintings’ content. When he
began work on a new set of White Paintings, Rauschenberg
instructed his assistant to “[p]aint them so they look like they

6. See KYLE GANN, NO SUCH THING AS SILENCE: JOHN CAGE’S 4’33’ 2–3 (2010);
Will Hermes, The Story of 4’33”, NPR (May 8, 2000, 12:00 AM), http://www.npr.org
/2000/05/08/1073885/4-33.
7. Latin for “is silent,” tacet is a musical scoring term meant to indicate that an
instrument or voice does not sound.
8. GANN, supra note 6, at 178–80.
9. John Cage: An Autobiographical Statement, JOHN CAGE (Apr. 17, 1990),
http://www.johncage.org/autobiographical_statement.html; GANN, supra note 6, at 111.
10. MORGAN FALCONER, PAINTING BEYOND POLLOCK 168 (2015).
11. Id.
12. Francesca Wilmott, Composing Silence: John Cage and Black Mountain College,
INSIDE/OUT BLOG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://www.moma.org/explore/inside_out/2014/01/03/
composing-silence-john-cage-and-black-mountain-college-3/.
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haven’t been painted.”13
With 4’33”, Cage sought to supply the same aesthetic
experience through musical composition. The work’s use of
silence, when combined with the socially self-imposed silence of
the concert hall,14 was intended to frame the other sounds that
occurred in that space during that time, both natural and manmade. By composing a soundless score, Cage sought to teach the
audience to listen for those sounds that are all around them that
modern society had trained them to forget were there. Writing
about that first 1952 performance, Cage said of the audience that
[w]hat they thought was silence, because they didn’t know how
to listen, was full of accidental sounds. You could hear the wind
stirring outside during the first movement. During the second,
raindrops began pattering on the roof, and during the third the
people themselves made all kinds of interesting sounds as they
talked or walked out.15

Despite—indeed because of—its lack of compositional
sound, 4’33” thus serves, as critic and composer James Pritchett
writes, as “a tribute to the experience of silence, a reminder of its
existence and its importance for all of us.”16 It is only through
silence, Cage believed, that we can notice the “permanent
presence of the sounds all around us,” and can come to learn that
those sounds are “worthy of attention.”17 In today’s wireless,
cacophonous, and ever-connected world, this is a reminder that
we need more than ever.
***
The story of 4’33”’s inspiration, composition, first
performance, and evolving meaning is not merely a story about a
13. Brice Marden, Statement Accompanying Podcast, Robert Rauschenberg: Among
Friends, MOMA, https://www.moma.org/audio/playlist/40/639.
14. As critic Douglas Kahn writes, Cage “extended the decorum of silencing by
extending the silence imposed on the audience to the performer.” Douglas Kahn, John
Cage: Silence and Silencing, 81 MUSICAL Q. 556, 560 (1997). See also GANN, supra note 6,
at 19 (4’33” “called upon the audience to remain obediently silent under unusual
conditions”).
15. GANN, supra note 6, at 4. See ROBERT KOSTELANETZ, CONVERSING WITH CAGE
70 (2003).
16. James Pritchett, What Silence Taught John Cage: The Story of 4’33”, Rose White
Music: The piano in my life (2009), http://rosewhitemusic.com/piano/writings/silencetaught-john-cage/.
17. MICHAEL NYMAN, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC: CAGE AND BEYOND 26 (2d ed.
1999).
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work of silence. Rather, it is a story about a work whose author
decided that the work be silent, and a story of the message that
the work intended to communicate—a message that could only be
expressed by not communicating, in particular the use of silence
to demonstrate that, as Cage said, “there’s no such thing as
silence.”18 It is a story of expressive choice, in particular Cage’s
decision to reject locution so as to convey his intended meaning.19
Which means that for First Amendment scholars, it presents a test
case.
In their illuminating and timely new book, Free Speech
Beyond Words, Mark Tushnet, Alan Chen, and Joseph Blocher
ask whether the First Amendment applies to expression that, like
4’33”, but also like Lewis Carroll’s nonsense poem Jabberwocky
or Jackson Pollock’s splatter painting, does not use words or
conventionally representational imagery. It is a question that, as
the authors show, the United States Supreme Court has long
assumed has an affirmative answer. Even though such works do
not use words to express ideas or otherwise convey meaning, and
even though the Court is asking whether such works are within
“the freedom of speech,” the Court has unanimously declared that
they are “unquestionably shielded” by the Speech Clause (p. 2).20
The question that Tushnet, Chen, and Blocher seek to answer is
why that is so.
Why ask why such works are “shielded” by the First
Amendment, then, especially since the Court has long treated the
answer as a given? According to the authors, the Court runs
doctrinal risks when it glides past what Frederick Schauer calls the
“coverage” First Amendment question in its rush to reach the
“protection” question.21 Tushnet et al. begin with the unassailable
premise that communication involves much more than the use of
18. KOSTELANETZ, supra note 15, at 70.
19. According to linguistic philosopher J. L. Austin, “A locutionary act has to do with
the simple act of a speaker saying something, i.e. the act of producing a meaningful
linguistic expression.” YAN HUANG, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PRAGMATICS 176
(2012).
20. Quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 568–69 (1995).
21. As Schauer and the authors note, the First Amendment’s boundaries—what it
protects—are “far more consequential” than the doctrinal work that comes after an
affirmative answer to the coverage question—i.e., whether the speech-affecting regulation
is content-based or content-neutral and the like. (p. 2, citing Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience,
117 HARV. L REV. 1765, 1767 (2004)).
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words to convey meaning, and thus “speech” for First
Amendment purposes must entail more than that as well (p. 1).
But that premise cannot alone drive the Court’s conclusion that
wordless communication is covered by the Amendment.
Setting the boundaries of the First Amendment is a project
of determining coverage, not protection, and we need
independent justifications for finding coverage exists in order for
free speech law to cohere. Additionally, ignoring coverage is
doubly dangerous, the authors argue, precisely because the tools
the Court uses in deciding the protection question have become
so settled in favor of protecting speech, while the tools for
determining coverage questions are, in many cases and to borrow
John Cage’s term, tacet.22 First Amendment protection rules are
so outcome-determinative that the answer to the protection
question in cases like U.S. v. Stevens,23 Sorrell v. IMS Health,24 and
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association25 is doing
boundary-setting work which should properly be addressed at the
preliminary point of deciding whether First Amendment coverage
exists or not (p. 3).
This approach, in the view of the authors, is exactly
backwards. The question of what the First Amendment covers is
a more consequential question than whether the First
Amendment protects a particular speaker or group of speakers in
a particular case.26 Yet the Court continually bogs down in the
application of First Amendment rules where the outcome with
respect to those rules is in little doubt, and with almost no rigorous
predicate analysis of whether the First Amendment applies in the
first instance.
A look at the Court’s recent work bears this reading out.
Pages are a rough proxy at best for the depth of legal analysis

22. See supra note 7. To be sure and as discussed infra, some historical or theoretical
approaches are occasionally used to decide coverage questions in First Amendment cases.
The test from Spence v. Washington is one such approach. But the Court’s applications of
these tools to coverage questions is so intermittent and inconsistent that they may as well
say almost nothing at all.
23. U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010).
24. Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
25. Brown v. Entertainment Merchants’ Association, 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
26. See also Schauer, supra note 21, at 1767 (“[Q]uestions about the involvement of
the First Amendment in the first instance are often far more consequential than are the
issues surrounding the strength of protection that the First Amendment affords the speech
to which it applies. Once the First Amendment shows up, much of the game is over.”).
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within those pages.27 But to demonstrate the authors’ premise,
below is a chart showing the three aforementioned First
Amendment cases, the length of the slip opinions in those cases,
and the approximate amount of discussion, as measured by pages
in those opinions, that the Court’s members spend analyzing the
coverage question with respect to the claim at issue as opposed to
the protection question:

Case

Total
pages

Coverage analysis

Protection
analysis

Stevens

52

5 pp. (maj. op.)
9 pp. (diss.)

11 pp. (maj. op.)
9 pp. (diss.)

Sorrell

53

6 pp. (maj. op.)
0 p. (diss.)

16 pp. (maj. op.)
24 pp. (diss.)

Brown

92

½ p. (maj. op.)28
0 p. (concur. op.)29
20 pp. (Thomas diss.)30
0 p. (Breyer diss.)

15 pp. (maj. op.)
0 p. (concur. op.)
0 p. (Thomas diss.)
12 pp. (Breyer diss.)

Putting aside Justice Thomas’ dissent in Brown—his
commitment to original public meaning-based interpretation
causes Thomas to sometimes be an outlier on the current Court
with respect to treatment of First Amendment coverage

27. Perhaps this Review’s length proves the point.
28. In Brown, California, which was defending its statute prohibiting the sale of
violent video games to minors against First Amendment challenge, acknowledged that
“video games qualify for First Amendment protection.” Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Assoc.,
564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011).
29. Justice Alito, joined in concurring in the judgment by Justice Scalia, would have
invalidated the California statute on facial vagueness grounds and thus would not have
reached the First Amendment coverage and protection questions. Id. at 807 (Alito, J.,
concurring in judgment).
30. Justice Thomas’ dissent in Brown argued that the original public meaning of the
First Amendment could not have understood the “freedom of speech” to include a right
to speak to children without their parents’ consent, and thus the Amendment did not cover
the right of video game manufacturers to sell their games to children. Id. at 821 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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questions31—the contrast within this admittedly small sample size
is stark. The Court spent more than triple the amount of time in
its opinions’ pages discussing the extent of the First Amendment’s
protection as it did discussing whether the First Amendment
applied to the relevant communicative acts at all. This is a bizarre
way to decide cases.32
First of all, it carves out the First Amendment from the
hardiest canon of construction in all of public law: the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance.33 Of course, the more conventional
version of constitutional avoidance instructs that courts should
strive to interpret statutes so as to avoid raising constitutional
questions. But an analogous form of constitutional avoidance
occurs when, as A. E. Dick Howard notes, the Court “pass[es] up
a more difficult constitutional question in favor of another which,
albeit constitutional, was hardly controversial.”34 As the authors
write, “[t]he whole point of treating the First Amendment as
having boundaries is to avoid in-depth analysis of cases involving
uncovered conduct” (p. 4, emphasis in original). If the Court were
to actually engage the question of First Amendment coverage, it
could dispense with protection questions when it had before it an
allegedly communicative act that was not sufficiently expressive
to fall within the Amendment. But because protection doctrine is
well developed (some might instead say larded up), with its many
multipart tests and tiers of scrutiny, and coverage doctrine is
largely an act of assumption, legal analysis is pulled toward
questions which have existing tools available to answer them. It is
temptingly easy to apply longstanding doctrines and balancing
tests that weigh speaker and state interests, and similarly tempting
31. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410–11 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(finding that “the First Amendment, as originally understood, does not protect student
speech in public schools.”).
32. Though the Court’s foundational First Amendment coverage cases were written
at a time when opinions were much less verbose, they similarly spend very little time
developing a coverage doctrine that can be applied in subsequent cases. See Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (one paragraph); Spence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 409-11 (1974) (four paragraphs).
33. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (labeling
the Brandeis opinion in Ashwander “one of the most respected opinions ever written by a
Member of this Court”).
34. A. E. Dick Howard, Out of Infancy: The Roberts Court at Seven, 98 VA. L. REV.
IN BRIEF 76, 84 (2012) (discussing the Court’s avoidance of the First Amendment question
in favor of a more straightforward vagueness question in Fox Television Stations v. FCC,
567 U.S. 239 (2011)).
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to assume coverage exists because there are fewer tools to answer
that question. But by placing its focus on protection over
coverage, the Court is choosing the question that is superficially
more difficult, but is in fact more straightforward, and certainly
less controversial.
Without clear guideposts for lower courts concerning what
the First Amendment covers and what it does not, those courts
are forced to follow the Supreme Court’s lead and assume
coverage—that is, assume the Constitution’s applicability to the
allegedly expressive act in question—and then apply protection
doctrine. This is the exact opposite order of decision elsewhere in
constitutional law, where the analysis begins, and often ends, with
whether the Constitution applies to the individual’s act. For
example, in the substantive due process area, every case begins
with a careful description of the right being asserted, followed by
an analysis of whether that right is sufficiently fundamental to fall
within the liberty component of the Due Process Clause.35
Consider too the Second Amendment, as manifested in the
District of Columbia v. Heller case—there the majority and
dissenting opinions spent dozens of pages analyzing whether the
Amendment covered the use and possession of guns in selfdefense.36 In other areas of constitutional law, if the answer to the
coverage question is in the negative, the analysis in effect ends
there, other than some pro forma analytical t-crossing and idotting with respect to whether the law in question is rational.
Coverage, not protection, is the battleground upon which most of
the constitutional questions of the day are fought—except battles
over the freedom of speech.
So, there is little doubt that Free Speech Beyond Words
identifies an analytic gap in the Court and academy’s First
Amendment work. The next question up for answer is how well
the authors fill it. As I discuss in detail below, the book’s three
35. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (the Fourteenth
Amendment does not cover the “claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in
the act of sodomy”), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). The asymmetry
I discuss above is doubly strange given that the tiers-of-scrutiny analysis in the substantive
due process area largely mirrors the analysis used in Speech Clause cases.
36. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); see also Joseph Blocher and
Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental Burdens, and the
Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 296 (2016) (quoting
Schauer, supra note 21, in noting that per Heller, in cases involving bans on gun possession
by felons and the mentally ill, the Second Amendment “just does not show up [at all]”).
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authors each make novel and valuable contributions with respect
to how we should think about constitutional coverage for
“speech” that does not employ language or convey articulable
ideas. But the book as a whole can be read another way: as a
broadside, and extremely effective, critique of listener-based First
Amendment theories and doctrines that hang the presence or
absence of First Amendment coverage on, as the Court stated in
Spence v. Washington, whether “the likelihood was great that a
[speaker’s particularized message] would be understood by those
who viewed it.”37 As the authors prove, the question whether an
audience understands a speaker’s expressive act to convey a
particular message fails to resolve, and even frustrates,
meaningful inquiry into the issue of First Amendment coverage
for works that do not use words or convey a particular idea.
Indeed, perhaps a more accurate (though much less marketable)
title for the book might have been Free Speech Beyond Spence.
This Review proceeds as follows. Part I sets out and
comments on Chen, Tushnet, and Blocher’s arguments. In Part II,
I offer my own alternative, arguably more orthodox, framework
for analyzing claims to First Amendment coverage for what I call
“non-speech”—works of art and other expressive acts that, like
those discussed by the authors, do not use language to
communicate specifically articulable ideas. In brief, and drawing
from other areas of constitutional law, I argue that the First
Amendment covers not simply the act of expression, but also what
comes before: the autonomy-based right to decide what to say. As
discussed above, John Cage’s use of silence in 4’33” was
unquestionably an expressive act, even though it used no words at
all. Locating the Speech Clause’s protections earlier in the
expressive act permits First Amendment doctrine to rest
comfortably upon the idea that the Amendment covers
expression that does not use words but that nevertheless is
intended to communicate.
4’33” may be expressive because of its deliberate use of
silence, but it cannot follow that every use of silence necessarily
constitutes an expressive act. Part III sets out potential problems
associated with extending First Amendment coverage over
expressive non-speech acts, pursuant either to the authors’
approaches or my own, in particular the need for limiting
37.

Spence, 418 U.S. at 410–11.
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principles given a First Amendment theory and doctrine that
seems, at least in recent cases and law journal articles, to only
expand. If the First Amendment protects both speech and nonspeech, and everyone seems to agree that it does, then the final
need is for tools to identify when conduct is neither speech nor
non-speech—to draw the boundaries of First Amendment
coverage in a way that is clear and predictable to speakers,
lawmakers, and reviewing courts.
I. TESTING COVERAGE’S BOUNDARIES
A. THE EXPRESSIVE C#
The first category of wordless expression that Free Speech
Beyond Words takes on is instrumental music. The problem is
straightforward, as expressed by Alan Chen, the author of this
chapter: Why does the First Amendment independently cover the
“musical, as opposed to [the] lyrical, component of such
expression” (p. 15)? The First Amendment protects the lyrics of
Jimi Hendrix’s Purple Haze, which came to Hendrix in a dream
after having read a science fiction book called Night of Light by
Philip José Farmer.38 Chen states that by all accounts, the
Amendment protects the song’s opening guitar riff, independent
of the protection for the lyrics.39 But why? If Hendrix had never
put words to the song at all, why is it so clear that the First
Amendment’s coverage would still apply? What is the theoretical
basis for the conclusion that, for First Amendment purposes,
instrumental music, which is wordless, is “constitutionally
equivalent” to speech (p. 15)?
Despite that call of the question, however, the issue is not
hypothetical. As Chen shows, governments that have censored
music have usually done so due to the music’s lyrical content,
though this has not always been the case (p. 27). Nazi Germany
38.

See Jason Heller, A Purplish Haze: The Science Fiction Vision of Jimi Hendrix,

NOISEY (Mar. 14, 2017), https://noisey.vice.com/en_us/article/wnkgen/a-purplish-haze-the-

science-fiction-vision-of-jimi-hendrix. The novel refers to a “purplish haze” caused by a
“huge moon, hanging dim and violet and malevolent above the horizon.” PHILIP JOSÉ
FARMER, NIGHT OF LIGHT 34 (1966).
39. Chen points out that for many years the Catholic Church banned the musical
interval known as the tritone, which uses a diminished fifth, on the ground “its dissonant
sound evoked evil,” and that the Church even labeled it the “Devil’s Interval” (p. 27). He
does not note, however, that Hendrix used the Devil’s Interval in the opening to Purple
Haze. KEITH SHADWICK, JIMI HENDRIX: MUSICIAN 96 (2003).
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enforced its visions of cultural purity by banning the performance
and broadcast of what it called “degenerate music,” with the race
of the music’s composer as the usual stand-in for degeneracy.
Strict Islamists often ban instrumental music because of its
associations with secular lifestyles and interests. And public
schools here in the United States have been sued for barring
students from playing religiously themed instrumental music
during school-sanctioned programs (p. 29).
Chen argues that constitutional coverage of instrumental
music does not rest comfortably with any of the governing
theories underlying the First Amendment. First, it is difficult to
argue that music without lyrics serves either self-governance in
the Meiklejohnian sense or public discourse in the Postian sense
(pp. 32-33).40 Democracy-based rationales for the First
Amendment are, as Chen notes, “simply unhelpful” (p. 35) in
justifying constitutional protections for artistic expression.
Though Chen does not put as fine a point on it as this, these
rationales for the most part fail because they depend in large
measure on an exchange of information between speaker and
listener; however, a composition that no one other than the
composer heard at all, instrumental or not, is certainly covered by
the First Amendment, so coverage cannot depend on the
transmissionary aspects of expression. A prudish Minnesota
legislator who sought to prevent any of the hundreds of hours of
music in Prince’s vault from being released would have about as
much success in defending against a court challenge as he would
in trying to ban Darling Nikki from the radio and record stores.41
Similarly, truth-seeking rationales such as the marketplace of
ideas don’t do the job of justifying coverage of instrumental
music, since, as Chen notes, music without lyrics does not usually
40. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT 888–89 (1948); Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97
VA. L. REV. 477, 483 (2011).
41. See Nicole Lyn Pesce, Prince’s secret vault of unreleased music could produce
albums for another 100 years, NY DAILY NEWS (Apr. 22, 2016),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/music/prince-secret-music-vault-producealbums-100-years-article-1.2611146. The lyrics of Darling Nikki, from Prince’s 1984
multiplatinum, Grammy-winning album Purple Rain, were Tipper Gore’s primary
inspiration for founding the Parents Music Resource Center, whom we have to thank for
Parental Advisory stickers on the covers of plastic discs that used to contain digitized music
called “CDs.” See Censor This: Music Censorship in America, INTERNET ARCHIVE:
WAYBACK MACHINE https://web.archive.org/web/20030406085225/http://www.geocities.
com/fireace_00/pmrc.html (last visited Sep. 1, 2017).
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communicate a specific idea; indeed, the primary expressive point
of instrumental music is often to “say” what words cannot (p.
37)—though he does note that marketplace-based theories fit well
with coverage for instrumental music if one broadens the
definition of “truth” to consider aesthetic or cultural truth. To the
extent that current First Amendment theory supports coverage of
instrumental music, autonomy theory is the best fit. As Chen
argues, a composer may intend to communicate an idea through
the use of music, or instead “have no intent at all except to create
something beautiful . . . .” (p. 43).
Having discussed the existing theoretical approaches to the
coverage question, Chen then turns to specific rationales for First
Amendment coverage of instrumental music that may or may not
harmonize with those approaches. Chen notes correctly that
performing and listening to lyric-less music have played essential
roles in a host of areas of primary constitutional concern, from
individual identity formation (think: a Deadhead spinning to the
Grateful Dead’s Slipknot!) to cultural identity preservation
(think: Tuvan throat singing by nomadic sheepherders in the
Mongolian mountains) to nationalism (think: a march by John
Philip Sousa). But Chen’s project is to justify an independent basis
for First Amendment protection for instrumental music, and these
examples do not provide especially compelling reasons
supporting that distinction, since the analytical work they do is
actually to collapse any distinction between instrumental and
other kinds of music, or for that matter other forms of art. Hearing
the Beatles on The Ed Sullivan Show played a critical role on the
identity formation of millions of American youngsters. Whitney
Houston’s Star-Spangled Banner at the 1991 Super Bowl moved
as many hearts toward America as have Sousa’s marches.
Furthermore, some of Chen’s examples of government
suppression of instrumental music are not a perfect fit for his
argument that it needs independent protection in the first place.
In most of the cases of government suppression that he discusses,
the music was not banned for lacking lyrical content; Nazis did not
ban instrumental music because it was instrumental, but rather
because they were anti-Semites and racists who hated its
composers for being Jewish or Black. The presence or absence of
lyrical content in the music was irrelevant to the government’s
efforts to suppress. So too the cases involving school boards’
banning of student performances of religious music; there, the
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schools’ concern was not banning instrumental music, but
avoiding liability under the Establishment Clause. In the end,
Chen’s chapter does not so much as supply an independent basis
for instrumental music’s protection as argue that despite its lack
of message-conveying lyrical content, instrumental music is
actually not so different from other forms of expression after all
(p. 66). That is an important First Amendment-related
conclusion, and it certainly supplies an adequate rationale for the
Amendment’s coverage. But if the goal here is to demonstrate
what is different about instrumental music, then the argument is
only partially successful. If instrumental music is censored for
reasons indistinguishable from music more generally, then it is
hard to see why we need a distinct basis for its First Amendment
coverage.
Chen also works through an independent theoretical
rationale for First Amendment coverage that focuses primarily on
the music’s cognitive effects on listeners for instrumental music
(pp. 46-48), and finds these justifications to be mostly incomplete.
He is right that these theories do not do the trick, but it is for a
more simple reason than the ones he gives. Listener-based
theories for protecting nonrepresentational art like instrumental
music inevitably fail because of their focus on listener effects over
speaker intent. The best theoretical grounding for protecting
instrumental music on the same footing as speech, one that I will
present in more detail in Part II below, rests not with its effects,
but rather with its creation. Embedded in instrumental music, and
indeed in all conventionally nonrepresentational art, are artistic
choices—place the coda here rather than there, run the riff
through the fuzz pedal or not, or as Chen quotes Judge Frank
Easterbrook, decide “the right place for the major third” (p.
23)42—that are themselves covered, on the ground they are no
different, or no less expressive, than a lyricist’s choice to use the
sun as a metaphor instead of the moon.
As Chen says, “instrumental music is a unique way of
expressing and experiencing culture” (p. 68). But the upshot of his
essay is actually that with respect to the theory and justifications
underlying First Amendment coverage, instrumental music is not
really that unique at all.
42. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
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B. NONREPRESENTATIONAL ART AS “A GESTURE OF
LIBERATION, FROM VALUE—POLITICAL, AESTHETIC,
MORAL”43
While Chen’s chapter addresses questions about
instrumental music, Tushnet’s chapter in Free Speech Beyond
Words explores issues around First Amendment coverage of
nonrepresentational art. Of the book’s three primary chapters,
Tushnet asks most directly how to justify the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual
Group of Boston that Jackson Pollock’s paintings are
“unquestionably” protected by the First Amendment. And those
justifications, Tushnet argues, expose several of the
Amendment’s “unexpected facets” as well (p. 70).
Those “unexpected facets” include several interesting issues
such as the tensions between First Amendment coverage
questions and other doctrines such as copyright and trademark
law (pp. 109-112) and commercial speech (p. 112). Tushnet’s
primary contribution, however, is to demonstrate the many ways
in which governing First Amendment theories fail to justify the
Amendment’s application to nonrepresentational art. The
assumed conclusion that all art is covered because it is expressive,
Tushnet argues, necessarily falters because there are a range of
other human activities that can be intended to communicate as
well—many of which no court would assume are covered by the
Speech Clause (p. 85). Ticket scalping; panhandling; selling
bootleg T-Shirts at Fenway Park that say “Yankees Suck”44;
scolding one’s children in public; even political crimes like graffiti
or assassination—all of these activities can be spun by the people
engaged in them as both expressive and autonomy-affirming, and
thus for First Amendment coverage purposes, no different than
art.45 Additionally, as I discuss in more detail below,
nonrepresentational art, both on the canvas and via the mission
statements of many of its practitioners, consistently declares itself
as directly opposed to the communication of ideas (p. 75). A
43. This quote is taken from the poet Harold Rosenberg’s essay in ArtNews
concerning the significance of the Abstract Expressionist movement in American art.
Harold Rosenberg, The American Action Painters, ARTNEWS (Dec. 1952),
http://www.artnews.com/2007/11/01/top-ten-artnews-stories-not-a-picture-but-an-event/.
44. See Amos Barshad, ‘Yankees Suck! Yankees Suck!’, GRANTLAND (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://grantland.com/features/yankees-suck-t-shirts-boston-red-sox/.
45. Since this argument is also a critique of the intent-based approach to First
Amendment coverage that I propose in Part II of this Essay, I will return to it in Part III.
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speaker’s “intent to express something” alone thus cannot
provide the justification for First Amendment coverage of
nonrepresentational art.
To address these questions, Tushnet excavates the
presumption that all of art is covered by the First Amendment,
and details how that presumption can carry over to art that is not
intended to convey a particular message. The presumption,
Tushnet notes, arose for the first time while the Court was
wrestling with free speech questions concerning, of all things,
obscenity. In deciding what was obscene in cases such as Miller v.
California,46 Tushnet notes, the Court “assumed that material that
can be described as sufficiently artistic cannot be obscene” (p.
102)—in other words, the Court defined obscenity by what it was
not, namely, art. Art was covered by the First Amendment, so if
obscenity was outside the Amendment’s coverage, it could not be
artistic.47 Accordingly, if the presence or absence of artistic value
determines whether a particular expression is covered by the First
Amendment, then the Court is primarily not talking in those cases
about the freedom of speech, but rather the freedom to make art.
But who decides what art is? Nonrepresentational art
presents a difficult puzzle for the project of defining artistic value,
because it is not intended to represent any one reality, and thus is
aimed at subjective meaning-making more so than other more
conventional forms of art. Abstractionists like Pollock abandoned
representational art’s fidelity to the real appearance of things in
order to deliberately depart from shared meaning; as the quote
opening this Section notes, the primary motivating principle for
much of nonrepresentational art is to free artmaking from the
constraints of aesthetic value.48 Similarly, critics often describe
experimental art as not simply removed from a common set of
46. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
47. See also Sonya G. Bonneau, Ex Post Modernism: How the First Amendment
Framed Nonrepresentational Art, 39 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 195, 196 (2015) (“[V]isual art’s
main doctrinal residence stood in obscenity law’s backyard, as a vague definitional
tautology: art constitutes speech so long as it is not obscene, and speech is not obscene if
it’s art.”).
48. See, e.g., Thomas Girst, (Ab)using Marcel Duchamp: The Concept of the
Readymade in Post-War and Contemporary American Art, 2 MARCEL DUCHAMP STUD.
ONLINE
J.
5
(2003),
http://www.toutfait.com/issues/volume2/issue_5/articles
/girst2/girst1.html (Marcel Duchamp stating his ready-mades “sought to discourage
aesthetics”); Jerry Salz, Idol Thoughts, VILLAGE VOICE (Feb. 21, 2006),
https://www.villagevoice.com/2006/02/21/idol-thoughts/ (Duchamp’s work “provide[s] a
way around inflexible either-or aesthetic propositions”).

3 - ARMIJO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

306

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

7/21/18 1:48 PM

[Vol. 33:291

aesthetics, but anti-aesthetic—representing “a position of
openness, of inquiry, of uncertainty, of discovery.”49 The
experimental artist’s intent is usually not to communicate an idea
in the conventional sense, but to facilitate an experience in each
viewer or listener that is differentiated rather than shared. In
nonrepresentational art, this mission is usually accomplished
through the “deliberate abandonment of established forms.”50
The communicative dynamic intended by the artist/speaker, in
other words, is one-to-one rather than one-to-many. In contrast
to most other kinds of expression covered by the First
Amendment, the whole point of much nonrepresentational art is
not to impress a particular meaning upon viewers.
Despite this conflict, however, Tushnet offers a way forward.
By working through Justice Souter’s opinion in Hurley, Tushnet
notes that for the First Amendment to cover, the “meaning” that
observers take from a given expressive act need not be “univocal”
(p. 104). “The reasonable observer,” he writes, “must understand
that the object on view is expressive, though not all observers will
agree on what it expresses” (p. 104). Some viewers must
understand the expressive act to be intending to say something—
even though there is little shared understanding as to what that
message precisely is.51 This interpretation, which Chen also
articulates with respect to instrumental music, takes listener
autonomy seriously, but it is listener autonomy in its most radical
form: each individual listener or viewer is entitled to her own
interpretation of a nonrepresentational work.
So, in the context of art, not all viewers have to believe a
particular expression has artistic value in order for the First
Amendment to cover it. Coverage theory is free from Spence’s
uniform listener meaning requirement. Some can see Duchamp’s
Dadaist ready-made Fountain and notice how the curved
porcelain repeats and refers to the shapes used in representational
depictions of the female form displayed elsewhere in the
museum.52 Others will see what one art critic called a severing of
49. JENNIE GOTTSCHALK, EXPERIMENTAL MUSIC SINCE 1970 1 (2016).
50. Id. at 195.
51. At least one court of appeals has come to the same conclusion with respect to
Hurley. See Holloman ex. rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)
(the test for expressive conduct post-Hurley asks whether a reasonable person would
interpret conduct as expressing “some sort of message, not whether an observer would
necessarily infer a specific message.” (emphasis in original)).
52. CALVIN TOMPKINS, DUCHAMP: A BIOGRAPHY 186 (1998).

3 - ARMIJO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

THE FREEDOM OF NON-SPEECH

7/21/18 1:48 PM

307

“the traditional link between the artist’s labor and the merit of the
work”53—and perhaps notice, like John Cage hoped his audience
at Maverick Concert Hall would in 1952, the aesthetic beauty
displayed throughout everyday industrial life that modernization
has trained them to ignore. Others will see a urinal turned on its
back and wonder if a plumber forgot something at his job site.
Accordingly, the fact that a work of art’s meaning is
inscrutable or contested is not a barrier to constitutional coverage.
Tushnet’s argument that First Amendment coverage for
nonrepresentational art need not rely on a shared aesthetic
meaning
thus
shares
an
elegant
symmetry
with
nonrepresentational art itself. But it still carries a thread of the
very claim that the radical autonomy theorists that birthed
nonrepresentational art seemed to reject: that art must be
understood by enough people, or the reasonable (read “right”)
person, as saying something in order to be covered. We can surely
conclude now that Duchamp intended to say something with
Fountain in 1917. But what if no other person at the time saw
anything other than a urinal?
The First Amendment definitely covers Fountain now that its
meaning, or many meanings, to be as precise as Tushnet advocates
we should be, can be discerned from the work. But was that
necessarily the case in 1917, when we can’t be so sure that anyone
saw anything being communicated at all? If nonrepresentational
art is usually ahead of its time, then is it usually ahead of the First
Amendment as well?54 It would be odd indeed if the theory
justifying First Amendment coverage of nonrepresentational art
provided a weaker justification for coverage at the time the art
was made, since this would be the point at which the art was most
in need of protection from government censorship.
Speaking of censorship, of the three forms of expression
discussed in Free Speech Beyond Words, Tushnet’s case probably
presents the most to fear. On the one hand, he is correct to note
that “[d]irect regulation of artworks as such is rare, and what there
53. Philip Hensher, The Loo That Shook the World: Duchamp, Man Ray, Picabia,
THE INDEPENDENT (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art
/features/the-loo-that-shook-the-world-duchamp-man-ray-picabi-784384.html.
54. Obviously, this problem could also run in the other direction. See Richard A.
Posner, Art for Law’s Sake, 58 AM. SCHOLAR 513, 514 (1989) (“[A] work highly valued in
its time, or for that matter in later times, may eventually come to seem thoroughly
meretricious. Artistic value is something an audience invests a work with, and as the tastes
of audiences change, so do judgments of artistic value.”).
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is almost always takes the form of content-neutral regulations that
readily pass the relevant doctrinal tests” (p. 109). On the other
hand, governments have shown time and again a willingness to
impose their standards of what constitutes “good” art, and
nonrepresentational art usually finds itself across from “good.”
All of us of a certain age will recall when in 1999, then-New
York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani threatened to terminate the city’s
funding for and lease with the Brooklyn Museum of Art for the
museum’s hosting of the British exhibition Sensation, a show
which included, among other works, artist Chris Ofili’s painting of
a black Virgin Mary that incorporated elephant dung.55 To be
sure, Giuliani’s complaint was primarily due to what he viewed as
the offensive representational aspect of Ofili’s work, but many of
the mayor’s comments at the news conference discussing his
opposition to Sensation leveled charges that could just as easily be
applied to nonrepresentational works—comments like
“[a]nything that I can do isn’t art,” and “[i]f I can do it, it’s not art,
because I’m not much of an artist.”56 Similarly, in the 1930s, the
New Deal’s Public Works of Art Project subsidized more than
15,000 paintings, murals, prints, crafts and sculptures, all of which
depicted what PWAP’s requirements called the “American
scene,” and nearly none of which were abstract works. Artists on
the federal payroll were instructed that their works should not
include anything “experimental [or] unconventional”—evidence
of an “administrative bias against abstractionist practices in
American art.”57 During the Second Red Scare, Michigan
Congressman George Dondero condemned the foreign roots of
nonrepresentational art, and deemed abstraction as “inherently
threatening to American values and ideals.”58 Dondero attacked
55. Abby Goodnough, Giuliani Threatens to Evict Museum Over Art Exhibit, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 24, 1999), https://partners.nytimes.com/library/arts/092499brooklynmuseum.html?mcubz=1.
56. Id. See Paul Lieberman and Diane Haithman, N.Y. Art Show Gets Scathing
Giuliani Review: “Sick Stuff,” L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 1999), http://articles.latimes.com/
1999/sep/24/news/mn-13513.
57. JONATHAN HARRIS, FEDERAL ART AND NATIONAL CULTURE: THE POLITICS
OF IDENTITY IN NEW DEAL AMERICA 25 (1995); see also FRANCIS V. O’CONNOR,
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR THE VISUAL ARTS: THE NEW DEAL AND NOW 20 (1969) (PWAP
standards evinced a “suspicion of anything experimental or controversial”); Jerry Adler,
1934: The Art of the New Deal, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (June 2009), http://www.
smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/1934-the-art-of-the-new-deal-132242698/
(describing
“conservative” nature of PWAP-funded projects).
58. Bonneau, supra note 47, at 203–04 (citing William Hauptman, The Suppression
of art in the McCarthy Decade, ARTFORUM,Oct. 1973, at 48).
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nonrepresentational art from the floor of Congress, claiming that
“[c]ubism aims to destroy by designed disorder . . . Dadaism aims
to destroy by ridicule . . . [a]bstraction aims to destroy by the
creation of brainstorms . . . [and] [s]urrealism aims to destroy by
the denial of reason.”59 And though Tushnet focuses more on the
conduct of domestic governments than Chen, there are
international examples here as well; Fascists and Stalinists
criticized nonrepresentational art as dangerously opposed to mass
culture.60 Unlike Chen’s examples, most of which involve
government censorship of music for reasons largely incidental to
the music’s lack of lyrics, the nonrepresentational nature of the
art being attacked here is the very reason for governmental
scrutiny and scorn. So, the need for a freestanding theory
justifying First Amendment coverage for nonrepresentational art
is genuine, and Tushnet does essential work in providing one.
C. “ALL MIMSY WERE THE BOROGOVES”61: SENSE IN THE
NONSENSE
Finally, in a chapter by Joseph Blocher, Free Speech Beyond
Words considers the First Amendment coverage question through
the lens of nonsense speech. Of the three authors, Blocher has
given himself by far the hardest swath to mow. Scholars and the
Court have often tied First Amendment coverage to the presence
or absence of meaning (p. 114); nonsense, based on this framing,
is meaning’s opposite. Blocher uses nonsense as a tool to cast
considerable doubt on the reflexive notion that “meaning is a
prerequisite for constitutional coverage” (p. 115). In particular, he
shows the damage it would do to the First Amendment if that
notion were correct. Examining nonsense from a theoretical
perspective demonstrates that meaning does not, and indeed
cannot, carry the constitutional weight that many commentators
and judges have assumed it does.
Blocher begins by distinguishing among types of nonsense,
since the rationales for First Amendment coverage might vary
depending on the particular kind of nonsense at issue. First, there
59. 95 Cong. Rec. 11, 584–85 (1949) (Rep. Dondero delivering a speech entitled
Modern Art Shackled to Communism).
60. See Bonneau, supra note 47, at 202 (citing CLEMENT GREENBERG, AVANTGARDE AND KITSCH (1939), reprinted in CLEMENT GREENBERG, ART AND CULTURE:
CRITICAL ESSAYS 3, 19 (1961)).
61. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS, AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE 21 (1872).
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is what Blocher calls “overt nonsense,” namely, the “intentional
and apparent” use of words that, individually or in combination,
“lack[] meaning” (pp. 120-121), or the Jabberwockys or William
Burroughs-inspired cut-up poems of the world.62 This labeling is
consistent with critical commentaries on nonsense literature,
which understand “nonsense as a deliberate strategy”63—or, to
use the terminology of this Review, the use of nonsense as a
deliberate communicative choice to favor rhyme, tonality,
alliteration, rhythm, or other kinds of acoustics-based wordplay
over linguistic-based semantic meaning. There is also “covert
nonsense” (p. 121)—those expressive acts where a speaker
intends meaning, but the meaning is not received, or if a meaning
is received, it is not the one the speaker intended. And though
Blocher does not focus on this problem, failing to lock down First
Amendment coverage for nonsense is problematic because it is a
very short step from Jabberwocky’s overt nonsense to uses of
words that sound or read more like speech, but nevertheless make
no sense. One need not leaf through a compilation of obscure
online experimental flarf poetry to appreciate this point.64 Here is
a sample of the lyrics from I Am Trying to Break Your Heart, the
opening song from the band Wilco’s Yankee Hotel Foxtrot, one of
the most critically acclaimed rock albums of the 2000s. You tell
me what they mean.
I want to hold you in the Bible-black predawn
You’re quite a quiet domino, bury me now
Take off your Band-Aid because I don’t believe in touchdowns
What was I thinking when I said hello?65

62. Burroughs described the cut-up method as follows:
Take a page. Like this page. Now cut down the middle and cross the middle. You
have four sections: 1 2 3 4. Now rearrange the sections placing section four with
section one and section two with section three. And you have a new page.
Sometimes it says much the same thing. Sometimes something quite different . . . .
William Burroughs, The Cut Up Method, in THE MODERNS: AN ANTHOLOGY OF NEW
WRITING IN AMERICA 345, 345–48 (LeRoi Jones, ed. 1963).
63. RICHARD ELLIOTT, THE SOUND OF NONSENSE 8 (2018).
64. Flarf poetry’s primary aesthetic is, in the words of its practitioners, “deliberate
shapelessness of content, form, spelling, and thought in general, with liberal borrowing
from internet chat-room drivel and spam scripts . . . .” The Flarf Files, http://writing.upenn.
edu/epc/authors/bernstein/syllabi/readings/flarf.html (last visited June 12, 2018).
65. WILCO, I Am Trying to Break Your Heart, on YANKEE HOTEL FOXTROT (selfreleased 2001; Nonesuch Records 2002). One might argue that the expressive content of
lyrics like these, like those of Jabberwocky, is rhythmic rather than literal meaning.
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In a doctrinal world where First Amendment rules and
theory are meaning-dependent, coverage of nonsense—even
speech that is intended to have meaning but winds up being
nonsense for the reasons Blocher describes—is at risk. However,
as he notes, there is little debate that coverage does indeed reach
nonsense of all kinds, or more specifically that stream-ofconsciousness composition, automatic writing, and surrealist
literature are “speech” for First Amendment purposes. To resolve
this inconsistency, Blocher turns away from law and towards
analytic philosophy—particularly its rejection, primarily via the
work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the late 1940s and early 1950s, of
the concept of “representational meaning” (pp. 116-117).
By representational meaning, philosophers meant that
language only had meaning when it connected to “extralinguistic
concepts” (p. 133)—namely, in the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, “the facts for which they stand” (p. 134).66 In other
words, as Wittgenstein argued, “the limits of my language mean
the limits of my world” (p. 136)67: because the existence of reality
depended on the use of language to describe it, language that did
not describe reality had no meaning. But in much the same way as
nonrepresentational artists began seeing artmaking as its own end
rather than as simply a means to make references to things that
previously existed in the visual world, the analytic thinkers began
to see the defects and limitations in representational meaning, and
adopted a different approach: language’s meaning depended not
on its “representation of the world,” but rather on its use—
“whether or not” the speakers have “followed the rules” of what
Wittgenstein called “the relevant language game” in which the
speakers are communicating (p. 140). If the speakers’ use is
following the applicable socially understood rules of the
applicable language game, then their use of language will be
processed and understood by their co-party or co-parties in the

66. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 443, 460 (1899); see also Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Harold J. Laski (May
9, 1925), in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, 737, 738 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Harv. U. Press
1953) (noting how difficult it is to “think accurately—and think things not words”).
67. Ludwig Wittgenstein, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS §5.6, at 149 (C. K.
Ogden ed. & trans., Harcourt Brace 1922) (emphasis omitted); see id. §3.032, at 43, 45 (“To
present in language anything which ‘contradicts logic’ is as impossible as in geometry to
present by its co-ordinates a figure which contradicts the laws of space; or to give the coordinates of a point which does not exist.”).
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communicative act. On the other hand, if the speakers’ use does
not follow those rules, the use results in nonsense. My uses of the
terms “NAFTA,” “Obamacare,” or “LBGTQIA” follow the rules
of the game of “faculty lounge language,” and thus have meaning,
but under the rules of the game of “father-young daughter
language,” my uses would produce nonsense.68
This shift is instructive for law, Blocher claims, because
current First Amendment doctrine relies upon representational
meaning-based analysis in several foundational respects.
Whenever a speaker, scholar, or court argues that acts are covered
by the First Amendment if they “convey[] ‘ideas’ or
‘information’” (p. 137),69 they are falling into the same trap that
the analytic theorists worked through when they abandoned
representational meaning in favor of a focus on language’s use.
Spence v. Washington, with its dual requirements that a speaker
“inten[ded] to convey a particular[] message” and there existed a
great “likelihood . . . that the message would be understood by
those who view[] it” in order for the First Amendment to apply,
is the apex of the representational meaning approach (p. 138).70
But by tying coverage to representation-based meaning,
nonsense, some forms of symbolic speech, and a range of other
expressive activity are by implication left outside the First
Amendment altogether.
In defending his premise that the First Amendment must
cover nonsense, Blocher is not as quick to question listener-based
First Amendment values as are Chen and Tushnet. Protecting
nonsense is consistent with marketplace theory, Blocher argues,
because “if the marketplace model requires judges to be agnostic
as to truthfulness, it seems they should also be agnostic as to
meaningfulness” (p. 125). On first glance, this reads like
autonomy theory wrapped in a marketplace-of-ideas blanket. If
the marketplace of ideas model protects nonsense because the
function of the market is not to facilitate the search for objective
68. The rules of this language game certainly depend on the age of the daughter
(mine is 8), as well as other contexts that Wittgenstein would deem as relevant to rulesetting.
69. John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1347–48 (2008).
70. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974); see R. George Wright, What
Counts as “Speech” in the First Place? Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37
PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1238 (2010) (“In the absence of the speaker’s intent to promote some
more or less determinate understanding, we may be skeptical that speech in the
constitutional sense is present.”).
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fact but rather solely what John Stuart Mill called “the likings and
dislikings”71 of individual reason and judgment, then there isn’t
much if any daylight between the collective search for truth and
the individual search for self-fulfillment through expressive
liberty. But Blocher is absolutely correct to argue that the
argument over whether nonsense in fact has value, expressive or
otherwise, is a form of searching for truth (p. 126), in much the
same way as Tushnet shows that arguing over what Duchamp
meant by the Fountain is evidence that the thing being argued
over itself has First Amendment value. This argument, however,
has its own limitations.
Nonsense, or at least what Blocher calls overt nonsense, is
usually an explicit rejection of the premise that words have a
communally agreed upon meaning. As Hugo Ball wrote in the
Dadaist Manifesto excerpted above for the epigram to this
Review, “words are other people’s inventions . . . I want my own
stuff.”72 It is certainly so that many have used the Manifesto, or
Carroll’s Jabberwocky, or Wittgenstein’s Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus, a work that Blocher describes as proudly
“proclaim[ing] itself to be nonsensical” (p. 126), in their own
explorations of what truth is, or what it can be. But to return to an
argument made above in response to some of Tushnet’s claims,
what about the overt nonsense that no one argues about at all?
Claims that First Amendment coverage attaches to nonsense
because “meaningless speech . . . can have value as a means to
truth” (p. 127), standing alone, is a version of the “art is important
if it has aesthetic value” that nonrepresentational artists and
nonsense writers expressly rejected.
This value-based argument is what Chen in the context of
instrumental music calls an “associative claim.” It attaches First
Amendment coverage not to the expressive act itself, but rather
to the “association” of that act with “particular events or historical
contexts” (p. 34)—here, the debates over those acts, the contexts
in which they were made, and the degree to which they contribute
to later debates. Blocher has to be arguing that the First
Amendment covers useless as well as useful nonsense, on the
ground that usefulness might one day blossom where once there
was only uselessness. Because he can’t be arguing that the case for
71.
72.

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 7 (1859).
Ball, supra note 5.
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First Amendment coverage exists only when nonsense is useful.
Most nonsense is useless, and proudly so.
Additionally, Tushnet’s “mutivocal” coverage solution
described above seems to be at least partially responsive to
Blocher’s covert nonsense problem. Under a multivocality theory,
First Amendment coverage will attach if some listeners ascribe
some meaning, or more broadly some intent to make meaning, to
the speaker’s communicative act. Accordingly, looking for
meaning per se in determining the existence or absence of First
Amendment coverage does not rely on any common
understanding on what that meaning might be. And Tushnet does
not need analytic philosophy to reach this conclusion. Indeed
Blocher, like Tushnet, points to Hurley as a “rejection of the
representational approach and an endorsement of the idea that
meaning lies in form and use” (p. 142).
Blocher argues that, in effect, the Speech Clause covers an
individual’s right as to whether to make sense or not. The First
Amendment’s primary concern is not with what we eventually
say, but rather in the decisions that precede the communicative
act. Which brings us back to John Cage.
II. NON-SPEECH AS THE CHOICE NOT TO SPEAK
It is no coincidence that Tushnet and Chen, and to a lesser
extent Blocher, all independently come to the conclusion that the
collective value-based theories underlying the First Amendment
are mostly inadequate for explaining why the Amendment covers
instrumental music, nonrepresentational art, and nonsense
writing. The making of art is an individualistic act that manifests
the author’s expressive choices, and thus any theory whose
justifications are essentially collective in nature, or depend on
others’ identifying or interpreting those choices, will not suffice.
Collective theories concern themselves primarily with the
exchange of ideas between the speaker and the audience;
however, First Amendment coverage cannot depend on an
audience’s interpretation of the artist’s communication, since as
Tushnet, Chen and Blocher show, the meaning-making of the
audience is often independent of the meaning (or lack of
meaning) that the artist intended. We are all deconstructivist free
speech libertarians now.
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In Part II.A below, I argue that the First Amendment covers
an individual’s decision as to whether or not to speak, whether
through non-use of words or via inaction. If this is true, then the
Amendment necessarily also covers one’s right to express oneself
without words. Part II.B discusses another area of constitutional
law, namely the Fifth Amendment, where the connection between
autonomy and silence is better theorized. Later, in Part III, I
attempt to draw some limiting principles around these arguments.
A. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS-BASED DECISIONAL AUTONOMY
AND FREE SPEECH
At its core, underlying the First Amendment’s coverage of
expressive acts such as nonrepresentational art and instrumental
music is a theory that resonates more with current substantive due
process doctrine than that of free speech. Governing much of the
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is an
understanding of the liberty component of the Amendment’s Due
Process Clause that protects the individual’s decision-making
authority on issues critical to that individual’s self-conception and
actualization—decisions on issues that are so fundamentally
personal in nature that the Court has long said the government’s
lawmaking authority cannot reach them.
Furthermore, and critically for present purposes, the Court’s
fundamental rights jurisprudence under the Fourteenth
Amendment recognizes that the sub-rights around that decisional
core, such as the right to decide to conceive a child or to marry,
for example, also include the inverse sides of those same rights:
the decision not to conceive, or not to marry.73 This view of
fundamental-rights-protection-as-decisional-rights-protection
recognizes that the Constitution necessarily protects inaction to
the same degree as action, as both are expressions of autonomy
and free will. A law that obliges married couples to use
contraception, for example, is just as constitutionally defective as
one that bars them from doing so, and for the same reasons.
73. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“[T]hese liberties
extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”); Bowers 478 U.S. at 191
(explaining that previous cases “were interpreted as construing the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to confer a fundamental individual right to decide whether or
not to beget or bear a child” (emphasis added)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(“[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the
individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” (emphasis added)).
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The First Amendment’s coverage is similarly multi-sided.
Even though the First Amendment expressly applies to the
freedom of speech, its coverage and protection must necessarily
apply to “non-speech”—acts that because of a deliberate choice
by the speaker do not use words, but nevertheless are intended to
communicate a message. It must cover both the decision to use a
particular set of words and the decision to not use words,
including the decision to be silent. It follows that the use of words
or not as a proxy for the presence or absence of expressiveness is
a red herring, because the decision to not use words is itself an
expressive act covered by the First Amendment.
To be sure, cases like West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette affirm that the Speech Clause protects one’s right not
to speak a government message, there the right to not recite the
Pledge of Allegiance, if one’s conscience so compels.74 Twentyfive years later, in Wooley v. Maynard, the Court declared that
the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. . . . The
right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are
complementary components of the broader concept of
“individual freedom of mind.”75

Likewise, Hurley itself, to which both Tushnet and Blocher
give extended attention, is fundamentally a right not to speak
case. There, parade organizers did not want to include the gay and
lesbian Irish-American group that sought to participate in the
parade, because the organizers believed that forcing them to do
so would force them to express approval of that group’s message.76
The right to non-speech relates to the right to be free from
articulating the government’s message, as recognized in Barnette
and Wooley, but it is not coextensive with that right. Where the
choice to be silent has a distinct expressive value, the interest
being protected is not simply the conscience-related right to speak
one’s own mind or not in lieu of another’s specific message. An
example of the First Amendment covering one’s right not to
speak would be presented by Louis Michael Seidman’s proposal
of a hypothetical law mandating that Americans cast votes on
74. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
75. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637).
76. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 574
(1995).
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Election Day.77 The right implicated here is slightly different from
that described in Barnette, Wooley, and Hurley, where the rights
at issue were to be free from government “restrict[ing] or
modify[ing] the message” a speaker “wishes to express,” “bear an
offensive statement personally,” or “affirm a [specific] moral or
political commitment.”78 Even though the government’s
compulsory voting law is not telling the individual for whom to
vote, there is no doubt that the First Amendment would cover an
individual’s decision to not comply with the statute’s mandate.
Through its power of coercion, the state is in effect trying to force
the individual to speak where she prefers to remain silent. And
this silence has expressive content, particularly with respect to the
social context of nonvoting as a commonly understood example
of protest through inaction. A similar infringement of a right to
not speak would be presented by a hypothetical public financing
system that directed a small portion of taxpayers’ payments to go
toward presidential candidates’ campaigns. There, the speaker is
being forced to communicate a message, by way of a political
contribution, that the First Amendment protects the speaker’s
right to decide not to make.79
Even though “withdrawing in disgust is not the same as
apathy,” both sentiments, though opposites, are often expressed
in the same way—namely by not speaking at all.80 And the First
Amendment has long been recognized to cover anonymity, or the
right “not to reveal one’s identity when exercising one’s
affirmative right to express oneself”; as Martin Redish writes,
anonymity is a “traditionally recognized subcategory of the
constitutional guarantee of silence.”81 Like silence, anonymity,

77. LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 9 (2007).
78. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 239 (2000)
(Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (describing rights at issue in Hurley, Wooley, and
Barnette respectively).
79. Cf. Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 16 (1990) (forced contribution of a
portion of dues to political candidates violates dues-payers’ rights to freedom of
association); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
80. SLACKER (Detour Filmproduction 1991).
81. Martin H. Redish, Freedom of Expression, Political Fraud, and the Dilemma of
Anonymity, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 143 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010); see
also id. at 149 (“[I]n an important sense, anonymity is a subcategory of a right not to speak:
the choice not to reveal one’s name is a narrower exercise of a broader right to choose to
not speak at all, because it represents the decision of the speaker to selectively limit his
expression.”).
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“as part of the suite of editorial decisions about what to include
or exclude . . . is itself a speech act.”82
Assuming this is all correct, it is a short step to go from
finding that the First Amendment covers “non-speech” to finding
it also covers nonverbal or nonrepresentational expressive acts
like those discussed in Free Speech Beyond Words. Inaction, or
non-speech, is one outcome of autonomy’s exercise, but so too are
other expressive choices. The Amendment covers David Levine’s
decision to draw a caricature of Henry Kissinger having sex with
a woman with a head shaped like the Earth’s globe and call it
“Screwing the World,”83 but it also protects Jackson Pollock’s
decision not to paint a similar portrait, and to splatter paint
instead. If the First Amendment protects Woody Guthrie’s
decision to join lyrics to music in the service of social justice, it
must also protect John Cage’s decision to express himself through
4’33”’s deliberate absence of sound. A right that covers how one
speaks must also cover whether one speaks at all.
However—and consistent with many, but not all of the
arguments made in Free Speech Beyond Words—the presence or
absence of First Amendment coverage for a particular speech act
cannot turn on whether the decision to speak or not has
communicative content as assessed by someone other than the
speaker. As discussed above, it is easy to imagine acts intended to
be expressive that no reasonable observer would understand to be
even communicative, let alone to express a “particularized
message,” per Spence. Including listener understanding as part of
the calculus for First Amendment coverage purposes cuts against
the commitment to expressive autonomy, as illustrated in cases
where the expression in question does not use words to convey
meaning.
Other constitutional contexts have better explored the
theoretical connection between autonomy and silence. Next, I will
briefly touch on one such context and see what we can learn from
it.

82. Paul Horwitz, Comment on Chapter 4: Anonymity, Signaling, and Silence as
Speech, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 181 (Austin Sarat ed., 2010).
83. See David Levine, Screwing the World (1984), ILLUSTRATION CHRONICLES,
http://illustrationchronicles.com/Screwing-the-World-with-David-Levine (last visited June
13, 2018).
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B. THE AUTONOMY-BASED RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT
Another area of constitutional law in which the connection
between silence and autonomy is more fully theorized is in the
Fifth Amendment context, in particular the post-Miranda v.
Arizona development of the right against self-incrimination.
Miranda itself relied on the proposition that an individual
possesses a right to remain silent “unless he chooses to speak in
the unfettered exercise of his own will,” and as Lisa Kern Griffin
notes, Miranda “references the concept of free choice nine
times.”84 Griffin argues that “misperceptions about what silence
communicates” prejudice criminal defendants, and that silence
does not indicate that the speaker has nothing to say, but rather
“indicates the need for a space within which to make choices,”
protects the “freedom to choose what to say to whom and when
to say it,” and “leaves room for individuals to form their own
plans.”85 Similarly, the aforementioned work of Louis Michael
Seidman notes that because silence is the predicate for speech,
silence must be protected “in order to give meaning to speech . . .
. [F]or speech to be truly free, there must also be silence.”86
Silence and choice, in other words, are inextricable. In the
view of these and other criminal justice scholars, in the Fifth
Amendment context, focusing on the observer’s interpretation of
the expressive content of silence or lack thereof is not part of the
analysis; it is part of the problem. The expressive value of silence,
as well as other forms of “non-speech,” cannot be left to the ear
or the eye of the beholder. Indeed, doing so can be, and often is,
prejudicial to the speaker who has chosen to express herself
through silence rather than words.
There is much that First Amendment theorists can learn from
this approach. At first glance, the stakes with respect to the First
and Fifth Amendments are very different. The risks around selfincrimination relate to “what the state does to criminals . . . .
[W]hen a person incriminates herself, the state puts her in prison,
or perhaps even takes her life.”87 However, determining whether
84. Lisa Kern Griffin, Silence, Confessions, and the New Accuracy Imperative, 65
DUKE L.J. 697, 704–05 (2016).
85. Id. at 698, 704–05 (second quote quoting Austin Sarat, Introduction: Situating
Speech and Silence, in SPEECH AND SILENCE IN AMERICAN LAW 1, 3 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2010) (quotation marks omitted)).
86. SEIDMAN, supra note 77, at 2.
87. Id. at 169.
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the First Amendment covers a particular act can certainly decide
whether one’s liberty is at risk. Gregory Lee Johnson, the
petitioner in Texas v. Johnson,88 was initially sentenced to a year’s
incarceration for burning an American flag outside of Dallas’ City
Hall. When the Court was assessing whether or not Johnson’s
conduct was covered by the First Amendment, they were literally
deciding whether or not he would go to prison. Despite its citing
of the Spence test, the Court’s focus was accordingly on Johnson’s
intent to communicate and the “context in which [his conduct]
occurred.”89 To be sure, the Court also noted that the “overtly
political nature” of Johnson’s act was “overwhelmingly
apparent.”90 But First Amendment coverage could not rise or fall
on Johnson’s audience’s understanding of his message—or
whether they understood it to be a message at all.
III. A SEARCH FOR LIMITING PRINCIPLES
It is simple to state, as the Supreme Court has, that free
speech “means more than simply the right to talk and to write.”91
But finding the border between expressive and nonexpressive
conduct has been a much more difficult task. That difficulty is
compounded by, among other things, the standard approach to
current First Amendment problems, which is discussed in more
detail in this Part.
A. THE SPECTER OF FIRST AMENDMENT EXPANSIONISM
The arguments such as those made in Free Speech Beyond
Words and in this Review defending the Speech Clause’s coverage
of nominally non-expressive acts must be viewed within a broader
First Amendment context. That context is one where
interpretations of the Amendment’s applicability and protections
nearly always expand rather than contract. As Tushnet notes in
an earlier article, First Amendment scholars, at least historically,
have long been collectively biased in favor of First Amendment
expansionism. He writes:
Scholars of the First Amendment seem to “like” the
Amendment [in a way that scholars of other constitutional

88.
89.
90.
91.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 400 (1989).
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
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topics do not “like” the Amendments that are the topic of their
study]. . . . What I mean by “liking” the First Amendment is
something like this: A First Amendment scholar hears that a
court has held that some local ordinance or state statute
violates the First Amendment, and his or her initial thought is
that the decision is presumptively correct.92

This bias, Tushnet claims, works as a one-way ratchet with
respect to First Amendment scholarship’s, and, by extension,
lawyers’ and judges’, views as to the Amendment’s reach.
Individual arguments concerning the legality, or even the
normative merits, of particular regulations that might be argued
to infringe upon speech run up against the unified presumption
that most if not all expressive acts are covered by the First
Amendment, and that those acts enjoy maximum protection. This
is a systemic problem, Tushnet claims. It leads to a faux balancing
where the government’s regulatory interest always loses, or as
Justice Scalia might have said, the dice are always loaded in favor
of free speech.93
Most interestingly, Tushnet also argues that even though
many (most?) of those same scholars believe that the Roberts
Court’s expansion of the First Amendment has taken a wrong
turn in areas such as campaign finance and commercial speech,
the reasons the scholars give are based not on the competing
considerations and counter-majoritarian difficulties wrestled with
across other areas of constitutional law, but rather on the
Amendment itself. Citizens United v. FEC and McCutcheon v.
FEC are wrong not because the Court showed insufficient
Thayerian deference to elected officials in a core area of
legislative expertise, but rather because the Court ignored the free
speech rights of “less wealthy and powerful speakers” to favor the
rights of “wealthy donors” and “business corporations.”94 Even
cases expanding the First Amendment are attacked as wrong on
92. Mark Tushnet, Introduction: Reflections on the First Amendment and the
Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234, 2237 (2014).
93. U.S. v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996) (accusing the Court of “load[ing] the
dice” in constitutional cases in order to reach its desired result).
94. GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST
AMENDMENT 157–58 (2017); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Tushnet here is
noting the absence of Thayerian approaches in First Amendment scholarship that pervade
other areas of constitutional law—namely, the idea that judges should only strike down a
law when its unconstitutionality “is so clear that it is not open to rational question.”
Tushnet, supra note 92, at 2244 (quoting Thayer, supra, at 144).
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expansionist grounds. The scholarly debate is not about whether
judges are over-steering at the First Amendment wheel, but
rather about the direction of the resulting drift.
This trend could fuel the implicit discomfort that some
readers might have with respect to the consequences of Chen,
Tushnet, and Blocher’s conclusions. If the freedom of speech does
not depend on the use of literal speech, and the judiciary and
academy both bring heavy priors to First Amendment questions
in favor of both coverage and protection, then governmental
interests in a range of cases will be deprived a fair hearing. It also
makes finding limiting principles in First Amendment coverage
even more pressing. Below, I first point out a few of the questions
that a choice-based coverage theory immediately raises, and then
attempt to offer a few such principles.
B. PROBLEMS WITH A CHOICE-BASED FIRST AMENDMENT
THEORY
If the First Amendment protects one’s decision not to speak,
then why would it not protect other failures to act that were for
expressive reasons? Would one’s failure to file federal income
taxes now be protected by the Speech Clause, if the reason for
doing so was to conscientiously object to the military effort
funded by those taxes? What about a refusal to report to jury duty
as an expression of disbelief in the criminal justice system, or a
host of other choices to not act that could be ascribed expressive
content by those making them? To use one of Tushnet’s examples
from the book, one could easily envision small businessmen
claiming that their decision to run businesses of a certain kind is
intended to communicate a message about income inequality and
corporate power (p. 72). (If you don’t believe this is plausible, ask
the couple selling raw milk at your local farmer’s market what
they think about the milk at your town or city’s largest grocery
store.) Similarly, Blocher argues that “[t]he expansiveness of the
autonomy conception leaves its defenders with a vast territory to
patrol, because nearly any act can be described as a manifestation
of individual autonomy” (p. 128).
In addition, a fully realized, autonomy-based rationale for
putting non-speech on equal footing with speech for First
Amendment coverage purposes could potentially do significant
damage to the regulatory state, particularly with respect to
compelled disclosures. If a meatpacker is protected from
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government interferences by its right not to speak, then FDAimposed labeling requirements might violate the First
Amendment. As Jed Rubenfeld wrote more than fifteen years
ago, “[p]eople constantly want to violate laws for expressive
reasons.”95
In a related argument, Tushnet also warns us about rationales
for First Amendment coverage that rely too much on speaker
intent, claiming them to be “both over- and under-inclusive” (p.
83).96 With respect to overinclusivity, all manner of nonartistic
activities are often intended to express some point, from the street
scalper striking his own tiny blow against Ticketmaster to the
leather-jacket-wearing loiterer on the street corner hoping to
convey his coolness. If First Amendment coverage is triggered by
intent to express, then it must follow that it covers all manner of
conduct that no reasonable person would put on equal footing
with speech, which seems wrong. And with respect to
underinclusiveness, he argues that many artists do not intend to
express any particular message at all; the “intent” behind much of
art, especially nonrepresentational art, is to explore the
relationship between shape and form, or following Cage and
Rauschenberg, to cause the viewer or listener to refocus their
attention in a new way, or simply to make something that has
never been made before. However, there is little question that
such works are covered. An intent-based rationale is thus
underinclusive if it would fail to provide a basis for covering those
acts, even those that adhere to artistic genres, which are not
intended to express anything at all. This too seems wrong. Hence
the problem with intent as the driving force for deciding coverage
questions.
C. SETTING AUTONOMY’S LIMITS
Both the authors of Free Speech Beyond Words and I argue
that the tools for First Amendment coverage questions need
further development so that in some cases First Amendment
protection questions can be avoided entirely. If that is so, what
might constitute what we could call a “First Amendment Step 1”
95. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 769
(2001).
96. Other scholars have leveled similar critiques at autonomy-based rationales. See,
e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 7
(1989).
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case, where a court would find coverage over a particular act or
inaction is not present, and thus there is no protection question to
which to proceed?97 If a coverage rule or theory is too vague or
too capacious, we wind up at exactly the point at which we began,
and which motivated Chen, Tushnet, and Blocher to write their
book—assume coverage exists, then let protection doctrine do all
the work. But there are some tools with which to solve this puzzle,
some of which are already a part of First Amendment doctrine,
and some of which flow from taking choice seriously as a
justification for First Amendment coverage.
First, with respect to underinclusivity, a commitment to and
thoughtful application of choice-based coverage theory can
resolve most concerns. First Amendment coverage for art lacking
intent to convey a particularized message may run contrary to the
dictates of Spence v. Washington, but it fits comfortably within a
choice-based coverage rationale. As I have stated, the basis for
First Amendment coverage is that the Amendment, like the
liberty component of the Due Process Clause, applies to
expressive choices, not the outputs of those choices. If output is
not outcome-determinative with respect to coverage, then the
listener’s role in the coverage inquiry recedes, and the question
whether a message would have been understood by its audience
is not dispositive. The decision to make art or not, and the lesser
included decision to make art that represents real life vs. art that
is a technical experiment in form of the type Tushnet describes, is
necessarily covered. And the reasons for the government’s
infringement on speakers’ exercise of their right to decide
whether and how to speak can also bear on coverage questions—
an inquiry that can apply not just to compelled speech contexts,
but to others. For example, a mandate that “no one shall make
nonrepresentational art” when the government has deemed such
art to be contrary to American ideals presents a clear ground for
constitutional coverage for noncompliance.

97. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Recent scholarly
work has sought to shed more light on the coverage question. See, e.g., Morgan Weiland,
Expanding the Periphery and Threatening the Core: The Ascendant Libertarian Speech
Tradition, 9 STAN. L. REV. 1389, 1457–58 (2017) (arguing that coverage questions should
focus on whether the speaker autonomy sought to be protected is “thick,” meaning
individually held and consonant with other First Amendment interests, such as selfgovernance or self-realization, or “thin,” meaning assertion of a bare speech right by
corporate speakers or other non-natural legal persons).
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At the same time, however, it cannot be the case that every
silence is presumed covered ipso facto because silence is one
necessary condition for making expressive choices. Inaction is an
actualization of liberty, but there is not pure symmetry between
action and inaction for constitutional purposes outside the context
of the Due Process Clause; there, inaction is protected only in
relation to the right at issue.98 Forced sterilization by the
government violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s liberty
component, but so does forced procreation.99 So too with the Fifth
Amendment; the relevant inaction there is in the context of
declining to respond to interrogation in the interest of avoiding
self-incrimination.100 In both domains, government compulsion or
proscription through what Seana Shiffrin terms “legal
regulations,
court
rulings,
and
materials”101—“laws,
resolutions”102—is what provides the basis for finding that a
symmetry between action and inaction exists.
There is also something different about these rights that
compels the conclusion that their protections are symmetrical—
that they extend to both action and inaction around that right.
Blocher writes in another article that “[a] choice right is a right to
do both X and not-X, where not-X means refusing to do or accept
X.”103 A particular right is deemed a “choice right” in “light of the
purposes” the relevant amendment is “meant to serve”104—and if
those purposes point to protecting choice, then the symmetry
manifests through the proscription of both government
prohibition (restraining one from doing X) and coercion (forcing
one to do X). In other words, certain rights are “bilateral”—with
respect to such a right, “the freedom to do x entails the freedom
98. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
99. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). The question may not be as simple as
this purely symmetrical approach would conclude. See I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution
and the Rights Not to Procreate, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1135, 1140–42 (2008) (proposing a threepart framework of legal, gestational, and genetic parenthood and arguing the “right to not
procreate” would operate differently depending on which of those three contexts applied).
For present purposes, I refer to the most general hypothetical form of forced procreation:
a law mandating that parents have children, or what Cohen calls gestational parenthood,
which proscribes the decision, to use the Court’s words in Eisenstadt v. Baird, “whether or
not to bear or beget a child.” Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
100. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
101. Seana Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 283, 287 (2011).
102. Id.
103. Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012).
104. Id. at 766–67.
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to not do x.”105 This is not the same, however, as a “generalized
right against coercion.”106
The right to freedom of speech is a quintessential choice
right. Its primary purpose is to serve not just the expression of
one’s views, but also the formation of the views one may decide
to express. It protects freedom of mind and thought, not simply
freedom of speech.107 Those interests require bilateral protection.
Accordingly, the First Amendment is implicated whenever legal
materials interfere with expressive choice, including when the
choice is not to speak.
Of course, this conclusion likely proves to some that speaker
intent-based coverage rationales are necessarily over-inclusive, a
charge made by both Tushnet and Blocher.108 It is certainly true
that all kinds of conduct can be undertaken with the intent to
communicate a message. If intent to communicate is the trigger
for First Amendment coverage, conduct that has long been
thought outside of the Speech Clause’s reach brings the First
Amendment into the picture, requiring what Tushnet calls “at
least a tiny increment[al increase] in the justification for
regulation” (p. 85) in a range of areas. And if, as I have advocated,
the coverage question is rooted in and informed by the liberty to
choose to decide what to say, including whether to speak or not,
then, to use Blocher’s phrase, the territory that autonomy
defenders must patrol may have expanded even more. In other
words, my proposed solution to the underinclusivity problem
compounds the overinclusivity problem.
However, making “the choice of the speech by the self the
crucial factor in justifying” constitutional coverage does not
necessarily enable a freestanding First Amendment defense to
safety regulations, criminal conspiracy, or antidiscrimination
law.109 By asking whether a particular act was primarily intended
as communicative, we can keep most of the corpus of criminal law,
105. JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 17 (1996).
106. Joseph Blocher, The Right to Not Keep or Bear Arms, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1, 54 n.15
(2012).
107. See Schiffrin, supra note 101, at 283 (“[w]e should understand freedom of speech
as, centrally, protecting freedom of thought”); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (free speech serves the interest of “individual selfrealization”).
108. For a related overinclusivity-based critique of this aspect of Spence, see Robert
C. Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1251–53 (1994).
109. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 52 (1989).
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for example, outside of the territory to patrol. The conclusion that
most of the law punishing verbal commission or participation in
crimes does not implicate the First Amendment is justified
because even though that speech is the product of decisional
autonomy, the primary interest in deciding to make it—the
speaker’s interest in the communicative act—is to facilitate
private gain, usually (though not always) at the expense of
another, or to otherwise infringe on another person’s autonomy
in a way that the criminal law protects.110
In application, Tushnet’s ticket scalper may have decided to
scalp over other forms of income because he believes
Ticketmaster and Live Nation are evil gougers. My “Yankees
Suck” T-shirt hawker at Fenway Park certainly believes the
message on his shirts to be both true and deserving of wide
dissemination. At the end of the day, however, the primary fruits
both intend to come of their labor are not social change,
monopoly-busting, or relocations from Manhattan to Boston, but
more cash in their respective pockets. Forcing them to get a
peddling license, limiting them to certain areas outside the
ballpark, or banning them altogether at risk of criminal fine
pursuant to generally applicable laws and regulations are thus
unproblematic, because their communicative choices to scalp or
to sell T-shirts with one message over another are not covered,
even though those acts could be argued to have been products of
expressive choice. Deciding to wear a T-shirt that contains a
message is different, even under a choice-based coverage theory,
than deciding to sell that same shirt. Other factors that serve as
reliable proxies for speaker intent, such as the form the speech
takes and the speaker’s desired audience, could potentially play a
much greater role in coverage questions than they do now.111
There are also, of course, externalities to constitutional
coverage for silence—and some of those externalities can be
negative. To find that the First Amendment materially impedes
government from forcing individuals to speak, especially in the
disclosure context, can adversely impact a range of decisions by
third parties, such as employees’ awareness and understanding of
their legal rights with respect to safety or other employment terms
110. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 742–
56 (1989).
111. See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1145–73
(2005).
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and conditions.112 It may be the case that when silence is intended
to mislead or obfuscate, it can be treated the same way as verbal
speech intended to do the same, on either the coverage or
protection end.
Whether it is information about an employee’s right to
organize or disclosures to prospective purchasers of a home,
covering communicative silence should not frustrate societal goals
that are more important than the individual’s right to withhold
relevant information.113 In situations like these, distinctions
between the right to not speak and the right to be free from
compelled speech can be helpful. With respect to compelled
disclosures, courts could differentiate between (1) forcing
someone to speak when they would choose to communicate via
silence, and (2) “anti-silence” regulatory schemes that recognize
those circumstances in which protecting silence can entrench
informational asymmetries that have significant costs for
prospective listeners.
The point here is not to provide an all-encompassing answer
to the issue of First Amendment coverage that fits every case.
(For example, if the “intent is primarily to get more cash in my
pocket” from above is my proposed non-coverage rule, then most
corporate political speech, as well as all of commercial speech,
would be outside the First Amendment.) Rather, like Tushnet,
Chen, and Blocher, my goal is to get us asking the question. I also
hope to show that an autonomy-based rationale for coverage does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that every act should be
constitutionally covered so long as an argument exists that it was
intended to be expressive.
CONCLUSION
Law professors are granted the gift of being able to give
sustained and intense study to all manner of judicial
pronouncements, even the most tossed-off ones. It is therefore
fairly easy scholarly work to take apart legal assertions that turn
out to be wrong. In Free Speech Beyond Words, Tushnet, Chen,

112. See generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace, 101 MINN. L. REV.
31 (2016).
113. See, e.g., Hill v. Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118–19 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 161 (AM. LAW INST. 1981), with respect to when a duty
to disclose, or as the court calls it “a duty to speak,” arises).
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and Blocher take on a much more challenging assignment: to
provide support for a legal assertion that is in fact correct. They
put to the side the questions of content neutrality, overbreadth,
and governmental motive which occupy so much of the current
collective thinking about the First Amendment, and focus their
efforts on a more fundamental question that, despite its
importance, has so far gone largely ignored: why the
Amendment’s “freedom of speech” applies to a distorted guitar
chord, spilled paint on canvas, and Lear’s limericks.114
In the article that provides the framework for the authors’
project, Frederick Schauer writes that “[t]he history of the First
Amendment is the history of its boundaries.”115 Free Speech
Beyond Words will stand as an essential signpost in helping
academics and judges alike to understand where, and just as
importantly how, those boundaries should be set.

114.
115.

See EDWARD LEAR, A BOOK OF NONSENSE (1846).
Schauer, supra note 21, at 1765.

